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Abstract 
Occupational fraud has persistently become a hurtful problem in micro-financial institutions (MFIs) in Cameroon. 
Staff and management of some MFIs are suspended, terminated, or litigated after they are suspected of 
involvement in occupational fraud over the years. Such delayed detections have caused huge losses to the 
organisations. In this respect, a study was conducted to examine strategies for timely detection and control of 
occupational fraud in MFIs in Cameroon. A simple random sampling was carried out to obtain 110 certified fraud 
examiners and auditors who have had the opportunity to audit or examine micro financial institutions in Cameroon 
from 2013 to 2019. They gave their experiences of strategies for timely occupational fraud detection and control 
in micro-financial institutions in Cameroon. The data generated was analysed, regressed, and interpreted. The 
empirical results disclosed that for MFIs in Cameroon to timely detect and control occupation fraud: they need to 
carry out frequent monitoring and surprise audits, institute tips and notifications, not rely on discovering 
occupational fraud through accidents and/or confessions and lastly, not to place reliance on information technology 
control and surveillance because the facilities that support their operation in Cameroon are poorly developed and 
greatly politicised.  
Keywords: occupational fraud, detection and control strategies, microfinance 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem and its Importance  
Public awareness about the shocking consequences of occupational fraud in both private and public establishments 
has multiplied the interest that organisations have to timely detect fraud and nip it in the bud. Occupational fraud 
is defined by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2018) as “the use of one’s occupation for 
personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organisation’s resources or 
assets”. It is a type of fraud committed against the organisation from within. That is, by the very people entrusted 
with the responsibility of protecting and managing the resources of the organisation such as the managers, directors, 
and employees.  
Occupational fraud has remained a persistently predominant and upsetting problem in Cameroon. Cameroon is a 
country located on the Gulf of Guinea. It is sometimes identified as either a West African country or a Central 
African country because of its strategic location at the intersections between West and Central Africa. With some 
240 native languages, and a population of close to 24 million people, Cameroon has French and English as its 
official languages. Yaounde is its political capital, and Douala its economic capital. Every organisation in the 
world in general, and in Cameroon in particular is either vulnerable or potentially vulnerable to fraud carried out 
by its workers. Most of the time, the damage caused to the entity is quite enormous and irreparable. Fraud always 
involves efforts at covering-up. As a result many fraud cases go partially or fully unnoticed, and the precise 
magnitude of losses are difficult to quantify (Seetharaman, et al. 2004). In this regard, it can only be reasonably 
estimated to quantify the losses (ACFE, 2012). 
Fraud involves deceit or trickery or false representation that leads to intentional concealment of truth in order to 
induce another to part with something of value, or to surrender a legal right [International Standards on Auditing 
(ISA) 240]. Occupational fraud also called internal fraud is the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment 
through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organisation’s resources or assets (ACFE, 2012). 
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In a nutshell, occupational fraud comprises fraud involving management and employees of the entity. Collusion 
within the entity or with third parties outside of the entity usually expedite the illicit practice. Occupational fraud 
results in either calculated misappropriation of assets, corruption, and/or distortion of financial statements, for the 
benefit of the perpetrator at the injury of someone, some organisation, or the public.  
The 2018 Report to the Nations by ACFE (2018) was based on 2,690 cases of occupational fraud reported from 
125 countries. The report disclosed that occupational fraud has a colossal impact on organisations throughout the 
world. With this in mind, and given that some micro-financial institutions in Cameroon during their general 
assembly meetings complain about suspected occupational fraud practices that have plunged their organisations 
into colossal financial losses over the years, the researcher developed interest to investigate timely detection 
schemes and controls to curb this recurrent situation.  
To successfully explore these areas the following research questions were designed: 
i. What are the occupational fraud detection schemes in micro financial institutions in Cameroon? 
ii. What are the occupational fraud control schemes in micro financial institutions in Cameroon? 
Consequently, the objectives were to:  
i. Investigate the occupational fraud detection schemes in micro financial institutions in Cameroon. 
ii. Examine the occupational fraud control schemes in micro financial institutions in Cameroon. 
1.2 Relevant Scholarship 
The occupational fraud related concepts reviewed are: management fraud, employee fraud, asset misappropriation 
fraud, financial statement fraud, internal control system, corruption, and microfinance.  
Occupational fraud occurs when one or more individuals in a management position, those charged with governance, 
employees, or third parties, intentionally act by involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal 
advantage. Management fraud involves one or more members of management while employee fraud involves only 
employees of the organisation (ISA 240).  
Financial statement fraud occurs when there is deliberate misrepresentation in the financial statement of an 
organisation in order to deceive users. Such a misstatement is considered material when it influences the economic 
decisions taken by the users (Accounting Tools, 2018). The primary responsibility for prevention and detection of 
irregularities and errors in an organisation rests with management because it has a contractual duty of care for the 
assets of the owners. Consequently, it is management’s responsibility to set up an internal control system. That is, 
a system of controls set up by the management of a company to carry out the business of the company in an orderly 
and efficient manner. Such a system ensures the adherence to management policies, safeguard of assets, 
completeness and accuracy of the assets of the company’s activities. An internal control system is composed of 
many individual internal controls (Oxford Dictionary of Accounting, 2010). 
According to the ACFE (2018) occupational fraud committed could be either asset misappropriation fraud, 
financial statement fraud, and/or corruption fraud. Misappropriation of assets involves stealing of an entity’s assets 
and is often committed by employees in relatively small and immaterial amounts. In some cases, management too 
is involved and with the means at its disposal it easily conceals the fraud. Occupational fraud can be committed 
by company directors or persons entrusted to hold and manage the assets in the interests of an organisation or its 
employees. Misappropriation of assets can be accomplished by embezzling receipts, creating false invoices, 
making false expense claims, stealing data and intellectual property, causing an entity to pay for goods and services 
not received, and using an entity’s assets for personal use (ISA 240). For example, using the entity’s assets as 
collateral for a personal loan. Misappropriation of assets also includes diversion of payments or creating fictitious 
or ghost employees, or an employee exaggerating the qualification and getting a job that pays according to the 
fake qualification. 
Corruption fraud also plays a significant role in upholding occupational fraud. Section 134 of the Cameroon Penal 
Code considers any employee who for himself or for a third party solicits, accepts or receives any offer, promise, 
gift or present in order to perform, refrain from performing or postpone any act of his office to have carried out 
corruption. Corruption is “an immoral and unethical phenomenon that contains a set of moral aberrations from 
moral standards of society, causing loss of respect and confidence in duly constituted authority” (Gould, 
1991). Corruption includes giving or accepting bribes or inappropriate gifts, double dealing, under-the-table 
transactions, manipulating elections, diverting funds, laundering money and defrauding. Center for Responsibility 
Enterprise and Trade (2018) asserts that corruption threatens a company’s potential or survival in numerous ways 
that may lead to significant business disruption, financial toll, legal implications, and negative impact on the 
reputation of an organisation.  
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Transparency International (2019) sees corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Depending on 
the level of loss involved and the sector where it occurs corruption can be classified as grand, petty, and political. 
Corruption and crime are endemic sociological occurrences which appear with regular frequency in virtually all 
countries on a global scale and in varying degree and proportion. The 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index asserts 
that big money in political campaigns and lack of inclusive political decision-making, perpetuate corruption. This 
assertion applies fully to Cameroon where during the 2020 legislative and municipal elections there was a lot of 
big money thrown around. 
Kelly (2015) proffers that Cameroon still faces multiple challenges in its effort to curb corruption due to insincerity 
and lack of political will on the side of the government. According to him corruption abounds in the customs, 
police, judicial system, public procurement and contracting, environment, and natural resources and extractive 
industry.  
Article 1 of 2002 law n° 01/02/CEMAC/IMAC/COBAC governing microfinance institutions in the CEMAC 
region describes microfinance as “activities undertaken by authorised entities that are neither banks nor financial 
institutions but take savings or deposits, give out credits or loans…” Microfinance is classified into 3. Category 
one MFIs institutions such as associations, cooperatives and credit unions collect savings and deposits and lend 
solely to their members. Category two financial institutions such as limited liability companies that function more 
like micro-banks, collect savings and deposits and lend them to non-members. Unlike category 1 institutions with 
no clear definition of capital, they have a minimum capital of 50 million F.CFA. Category 3 MFIs are lending 
institutions such as micro credit and project finance institutions that do not collect savings and deposits but give 
out loans. They have a minimum capital of 25 million F.CFA (COBAC, 2002).  
The theories of fraud triangle, fraud diamond, fraud pentagon, agency, differential association, and social control, 
were reviewed as related to occupational fraud. The fraud triangle theory was introduced in 1953, by Donald 
Cressey in the study of fraud. He contended that everything people do is motivated by something (Abdullahi et al., 
2015). Driven by why people commit fraud Cressey carried out a study in which 200 embezzlers imprisoned served 
as participants. His findings disclosed that every fraud had 3 things in common: pressure, rationalisation, and 
opportunity to commit the fraud. According to him it is pressure that emanates from insatiable greed, bad habits, 
and psychosis that motivates management and staff to commit occupational fraud. Fraud opportunities come up 
when the internal control system develops weaknesses known to the perpetuators. Motivation and opportunities 
are interactive. As a consequence, the less the known weaknesses in the internal controls, the less the motivation 
needed to carry out a fraud and vice versa. 
The fraud diamond theory introduced by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) is seen as an extension of the fraud triangle 
theory. In addition to the elements of the fraud triangle namely pressure, opportunity, and rationalisation, Wolfe 
and Hermanson (2004) introduced a fourth element called capability. The authors contend that without the 
capability to recognise the uncluttered entranceway as an opportunity and to take advantage to commit the fraud, 
even with the existence of the 3 elements in the fraud triangle, fraud will not be possible (Sorunke, 2016 and Tugas, 
2012).  
The pentagon fraud theory by Crowe adds one element called arrogance to the diamond theory which had initially 
added one to the fraud triangle theory called capacity or capability discussed earlier. Crowe (2011) asserts that 
chief executive officers possess a large ego, a bullying attitude, and an autocratic management style. These 
physiognomies enable them undermine internal controls and perpetuate fraud with impunity. These CEOs always 
fear the loss of position or status so protect it at all cost (Marsellisa, 2018). 
Another theory related to occupational fraud is agency theory. It demonstrates the relationship between two parties 
where one party acts on behalf of the other, although the two parties (principal and agent) have dissimilar interests 
and unequal access to information. This relationship generally results in an agency dilemma, where it becomes 
difficult to implore the agent to act in the best interests of the principal (Lucian and Jesse, 2004; Guangdi and 
Fulwood, 2013).  
The theory of differential association by Edwin Sutherland in 1939 and revised in 1947 contends that criminal 
behaviour is learned through interaction with other persons in the course of communication, and intimate social 
groups (Vinney, 2019). By interacting with others, individuals learn the values, attitudes and techniques, and 
motives for criminal behaviour. By this assertion, criminal behaviour may not just be explained through needs and 
values as seen in the fraud triangle and diamond theories. On the other hand, the social control theory argues that 
the institutions of the social system train and pressurise those with whom they interact into patterns of conformity 
(ACFE, 2016). This implies that if the institutions are corrupt, persons interacting with them will be brainwashed 
and compelled to comply, or be seen as ‘breaking the law’. 
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The findings of a research carried out by Norman Jaspan and published in 1960 revealed that for organisations to 
avoid employee fraud, theft and embezzlement, they must have to pay their staff fairly well, treat them decently, 
and give a listening ear to their problems. In discordant with Norman’s generalities, Hartung insisted that fraud is 
learned from the environment. According to Singleton (2010), the two submissions go together given that Norman 
(1960), disclosed that for organisations to avoid employee fraud, theft and embezzlement, they need to pay their 
employees fairly, cultivate a listening ear to their problems, and treat them decorously although not placing full 
confidence on them. An environment with many reasons and opportunities to commit fraud will irrefutably nurture 
fraud. 
Rahmana and Anwar (2014) in examining the effectiveness of the techniques of preventing and detecting fraud in 
Malaysian Islamic banks, disclosed that fraud will always occur no matter how much effort an organisation makes 
in discouraging and controlling fraud. They resolved that education of employees on fraud avoidance and detection 
practices was a praiseworthy solution for fraud. They suggested some measures to be simultaneously performed 
in order to mitigate fraud namely: dissuasion, prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation and 
prosecution. 
A report to the nations on the 2018 global study on occupational fraud and abuse by the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners ACFE (2018) disclosed that 2,690 real cases of occupational fraud recorded in 125 countries 
were analysed. The study conducted between January 2016 and October 2017. The data presented was drawn from 
Certified Fraud Examiners who investigated those cases. In 23 categories of industries, occupational fraud caused 
a total loss of $7 billion. Asset misappropriation fraud was at the top (89%) with a median loss of $114,000. 
Financial statement fraud although the least as it affected only 10% of the cases, was the most costly with a median 
loss of $800,000. Small businesses lost almost twice as much per fraud scheme, $104,000 median loss.  
The 2018 report to the nations identified tips as the most common initial detection method (40%), followed by 
internal audit (15%), and management review (13%). Internal control weaknesses contributed to almost half of the 
frauds. Interestingly, 18 anti-fraud controls examined allied with lower fraud losses and quicker detection. Owners 
and executives account for a small percent of cases (19%), yet caused a significant median loss of $850,000. Men 
caused more losses (75%) than women. Median losses are far greater when fraudsters collude: 1 fraudster $74,000, 
2 fraudsters $150,000, and 3 fraudsters $339,000. 
Furthermore, the report disclosed that data monitoring/analysis and surprise audits were associated with the largest 
reduction in fraud and loss duration. Unfortunately, only 37% of victim organisations applied these controls. Over 
the last 10 years, occupational fraud referrals to prosecution declined by 16% for fear of negative publicity. 
Fraudsters who had been with their company longer stole twice as much: $200,000 median loss for those who have 
worked for more than 5 years, and $100,000 for those less than one year. Only 4% of proprietors had a prior fraud 
conviction. 
According to the ACFE (2018) occupational fraud committed could be put in 3 categories namely: asset 
misappropriation, financial statement fraud, and corruption. The most common of these 88% was asset 
misappropriation, though the least costly, causing a median loss of USD 100,000. Financial statement fraud 
schemes accounted for 6% of government fraud cases and had a median loss of USD 315,000. Corruption schemes 
occurred in 47% of cases and caused a median loss of USD 400,000. Corruption in government cases had a 
significantly high frequency and median loss in the overall survey data. This confirms the public sector to have 
the highest risk of occupational fraud. In general, actions taken against perpetrators range from termination, 
settlement agreement, permitted or required resignation, probation or suspension, to no punishment at all. 
A study was carried out amongst Jordanian companies listed on the ASE by Shanikat, Al-Farah, and Dorgham 
(2014) to examine the effectiveness of occupational fraud prevention mechanisms in these companies. The results 
showed that management review of the internal control, internal and external audits are greatly and successfully 
implemented in all the organisations examined. Code of conduct, independent audit committees and surprise audits 
were ranked high in these companies, while mechanisms such as specialist or professional risk assessments and 
rewards for whistle blowing seem not applicable in Jordanian companies. 
2. Method 
A simple random sampling was carried out to obtain 110 certified fraud examiners and auditors who have had the 
opportunity to audit or examine micro financial institutions in Cameroon from 2013 to 2019. In an online survey 
the participants gave their experiences of strategies for timely occupational fraud detection and control in micro-
financial institutions during this period. 103 respondents (or 93.65%) successfully responded to the questionnaire. 
In a Likert scale the items examined were rated from 1 to 5, where: (5) = very strong, (4) = strong, (3) = fairly 
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strong, (2) = weak and (1) = very weak. The respondents rated each parameter under examination according to the 
degree of perception they have. 
A regression analysis was run with the aim of generating a regression output that was used in determining the 
effect of independent variables on the dependent variable. The study employed the multiple regression models 
shown below. The indicators of Occupational fraud detection schemes (OFDS) were: management review and 
internal audit (MSA), Fair treatment of staff (FTS), tips and notifications (TN), rotation of duties and abrogation 
of paid leave (RDAPL), information technology control and surveillance (ITCS), and accidents and confession 
(AC).  
Occupational fraud detection schemes = f (Fraud Control Experience)                  (1)  
From equation (1) above, it was considered that Fraud Control Experience will be broken into sub components as 
seen in equation (2) below: 
OFDS = f (MSA, FTS, TN, RDAPL, ITCS and AC)                            (2) 
Considering the importance of the intersect coefficients to be estimated and error term, the econometrics equation 
for the model becomes: 
OFDS = β0 + β1MSA + β2FTS + β3TN + β4 RDAPL + β5ITCS + β6AC + Ɛi                 (3) 
Where: 
 OFDS  = Occupational fraud detection schemes 
 MSA   = Monitoring and surprise audits 
 FTS   = Fair treatment of staff 
 TN    = Tips and notifications 
 RDAPL  = Rotation of duty and abrogation of paid leave  
 ITCS   = Information technology control and surveillance 
 AC    = Accidents and confessions 
 β0    = Intersect, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, and β6 are the coefficients to be estimated  
 Ɛi    = Error term  
4. Results  
Appendix 1 shows that 41% of the respondents have experience in occupational fraud detection scheme measures 
for 5 to 10 years. 37% of them have gotten experience in occupational fraud detection scheme measures for more 
than 10 years. So there were about 80% of the respondents who were well experienced in occupational fraud 
detection scheme measures. Appendix 2 presents the perceptions of the respondents on initial detection of 
occupational fraud. 
 
Table 1. Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
OFDS 103 3.029126 0.9747429 1 4 
MSA 103 8.097087 1.346852 4 10 
FTS 103 3.23301 1.541605 1 5 
TN 102 5.637255 1.440498 3 10 
RDAPL 101 7.871287 1.604141 4 10 
ITCS 103 8.165049 1.442337 3 10 
AC 103 5.932039 2.397965 2 10 
 
The summary of descriptive statistics are presented in table 1. It shows that most of the variables are having 103 
observations each. Also, the table above can be used as a prelude to test for normality. The average values of all 
the variables are greater than their standard deviations. This implies that the variables are normally distributed, 
making the model credible. 
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Table 2. Pairwise correlation matrix 
 OFDS MRIA EA TN DEAR ITCS AC 
OFDS 1       
MSA  0.1248 1      
FTS -0.0568 -0.1102  1     
TN  0.1320  0.1540  0.2321**  1    
RDAPL  0.0287  0.1907* -0.3258*** -0.0669  1   
ITCS -0.1917*  0.0068  0.1192  0.0988 -0.0120  1  
AC -0.0746  0.3360*** -0.1495  0.1395  0.1234 -0.1781* 1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The correlation results presented in table 2 show that there exist both positive and negative relationships between 
the variables involved in the study. These results also show that the correlation between one variable and itself is 
1, (perfectly collinear). The correlation results could also be used as a prelude to investigate the presence of 
multicollinearity. All these values again lie between the bench mark values of -0.75 and 0.75, which indicate that 
there is no problem of multicollinearity among these variables. 
 
Table 3. Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of OFDS 
chi2(1) = 13.83 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0002 
 
To test for heteroskedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was used. The decision rule is that, when 
BPcal > BPcri, we talk of homoscedasticity. Therefore, from table 3 Prob>chi2 = 0.0002, we fail to reject Ho, and 
conclude that there is constant variance. Hence no problem of heteroscedasticity exists in the obtained results. 
Table 4. Regression results 
OFDS Coef.     (Std. Err.)  P>|t| 
MSA 0.1271    (0.0761)  0.098  
FTS -0.0601   (0.0667)  0.369  
TN 0.1680    (0.0718)  0.021  
RDAPL 0.0133    (0.0629)  0.833  
ITCS -0.1739   (0.0664)  0.010  
AC -0.0943   (0.0427)  0.030 
Cons. 3.1316    (0.9564)  0.001  
Number of obs = 103 
F(6, 93) = 2.58 
Prob > F = 0.0234 
Adj R-squared = 0.875 
 
4. Discussion 
From the regression results presented in table 4 it can be clearly deduced that the value for Fcal (6, 93) > P(0.0234). 
We reject Ho, and conclude that the independent variables have significant effects on the dependent variable 
(OFDS), and this is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Thus, the overall model is well fitted.  
The value for Adjusted R2 indicates the degree of variations in OFDS captured by variations in the variables used 
in the model. From the result in table 4, the value of Adjusted R2 is 0.875 indicating that 87.5% variation in OFDS 
is attributed to changes (variations) in the variables included in the model while 12.5% variations in OFDS is 
caused by variables not included in the model. The coefficient of the constant 3.1316 indicates the intersect, which 
implies that if all the independent variables under study were considered to be zero or not to have any effect on 
the dependent variable (OFDS), then OFDS will be 3.1316 in the model.  
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The coefficient of monitoring and surprise audits (MSA) is positive, indicating a positive relationship between 
MSA and OFDS. The MSA coefficient of 0.1271 indicates that an increase in MSA by a unit will lead to an 
increase in OFDS by 0.1271. This result is statistically significant at 10% level. It agrees with the results of the 
study carried out amongst Jordanian companies listed on the ASE by Shanikat, Al-Farah, and Dorgham (2014).  
Management review and internal audits are very effective occupational fraud prevention mechanisms. The result 
is also in line with the 2018 report to the nations by ACFE which revealed that data monitoring/analysis and 
surprise audits were associated with the largest reduction in fraud and loss duration. Apart of the fact that they 
deter occupational fraud, the process allows management to easily identify and correct any internal control 
weaknesses that could create opportunities for fraud. 
The coefficient of tips and notification (TN) is also positive indicating a positive relationship between TN and 
OFDS. The TN coefficient of 0.1680 indicates that an increase in TN by a unit will lead to an increase in OFDS 
by 0.1680. This result is statistically significant at 5% level. It is very important for organisations to put a price tag 
for whistle blowing, tips and notifications from both the internal and external stakeholders. In this way 
occupational fraud can easily be detected and put under control. The result is in consonance with one of the results 
of the 2018 report to the nations which identified tips as the most common initial detection method constituting 
40% of the detection methods (ACFE, 2018). 
The coefficient of information technology control and surveillance (ITCS) is negative indicating a negative 
relationship between ITCS and OFDS. The ITCS coefficient of -0.1739 indicates that an increase in ITCS by a 
unit, will lead to a decrease in OFDS by 0.1739. This effect is statistically significant at 5% level. This could be 
attributed to the fact that facilities that cause ITCS to thrive in Cameroon such as uninterrupted internet and 
electricity supplies are still very poorly developed. Sometimes the Cameroon government deliberately cuts off 
these facilities in order to grabble with its own internal security challenges. This happens quite often in the North 
West and South West Regions of the country where since 2017 armed conflicts between ‘restorationists’ (called 
Ambazonians) and government forces escalated with very severe human rights abuses.  
Furthermore, the coefficient of accidents and confessions (AC) is also negative indicating a negative relationship 
between AC and OFDS. The AC coefficient of -0.0943 indicates that an increase in AC by a unit, this will lead to 
a decrease in OFDS by 0.0943. This effect is statistically significant at 5% level. This tells us that organisations 
that wait for fraud to be disclosed accidentally, or fraudsters to confess their sins may never detect any occupational 
fraud. Rather, more productive strategies should be put in place to curb occupational fraud.  
5. Policy Recommendations and Conclusion 
This study reveals the strategies for occupational fraud detection and control in micro-financial institutions in 
Cameroon. They are recommended to be used by microfinance institutions themselves, regulatory authorities, 
supervisors, anti-money laundering and fraud officials.  
The first one is that monitoring and surprise audits should be applied frequently. This is a very effective 
occupational fraud prevention strategy associated with significant reduction in fraud and loss duration. This 
technique has a deterrent effect on the perpetuation of occupational fraud since potential fraudsters are not aware 
of when the stratagem can be executed. Because of this uncertainty committing the fraud and concealing it before 
monitoring and surprise audits take place, many potential occupational frauds can be significantly avoided.  
The second recommendation is that tips and notifications be they from law enforcement officers or other interested 
parties should be greatly promoted because they facilitate occupational fraud detection and prevention. MFIs 
should pay attention to behavioural red flags, and make public that whistle blowers, tipsters, and informants of 
suspected occupational fraud will be highly compensated and their identities undisclosed. With such a price tag, 
most management and staff will be deterred from engaging in fraudulent activities knowing that colleagues and 
the public are on the alert to report suspects and pick up prizes. This should be the commonest initial detection 
method that MFIs can embrace and implement. 
The third recommendation is that MFIs in Cameroon should not place much reliance on information technology 
control and surveillance as a strategy to timely detect and control occupational fraud because of the poor 
development and politicisation of facilities that support their operation especially electricity and internet supplies. 
In Cameroon, electricity and internet supplies are interrupted either deliberately or inadvertently on daily basis 
even in the political, economic, and regional capitals of the country.  
Fourthly MFIs in Cameroon should never hope to discover an occupational fraud through an accident and/or a 
confession. The organisation should rather develop more productive strategies to curb occupational fraud bearing 
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in mind that unless workers are educated on professional code of ethics and preached the Gospel of repentance or 
instant death, it is unexpected that a confession can be given by a culprit.  
MFIs should treat their workers fairly and still have in mind that the best of salaries and other working conditions 
may reduce occupational fraud but will never exterminate it. Some frauds are committed by management and staff 
suffering from insatiable greed and/or psychosis. The best way out of such a situation is to apply all the above 
strategies simultaneously. 
In conclusion, no organisation in the world is completely free from occupational fraud. Consequently, every MFI 
in Cameroon should put in place sound internal control systems and adopt and implement the four strategies 
recommended in this study in order to ensure timely detection and control of occupational fraud before it inflicts 
heavy losses on the entity. 
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Appendix 2 
Items on initial detection of occupational fraud 
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